Relational governance and value distribution of the cotton chain in Cameroon
- Literature reference
-
- Author
- Michel FOK
- English title of the work
- Relational governance and value distribution of the cotton chain in Cameroon
- Title of the work
- Relational governance and value distribution of the cotton chain in Cameroon
- Year of publication
- 2021?
- Author's email
- michel.fok@cirad.fr
- Journal or magazine
- Submitted to Journal of Development Studies
- Miscellaneous extra information
- Paper under review
- Publisher's address
- 3 Plan des chanterelles
- Countries concerned
-
Cameroon
- Associated thesauruses
-
Colire
- Keywords Colire
Association types
Professional associations
Cotton producers' groups
Associative sustainability
Associative governance
Associations' activities
Association & input supply
Association & sector management
Association & marketing management
Association & service supply
Interprofessional management sustainability
Roles of farmers' institutions
Interprofession funding mechanism
Interprofession status and rules
Activities managed by interprofession
Sector management of seedcotton ginning
Sector management of input credit
Regional factors of specificities
African specificities
Country factors of specificities
Country factors of specificities
Assessment models and modelling
Assessment methods
Role of parastatal organizations
Monopoly
Influence of private sector
Public/private partnership
Local garment industry
Textile industry
Local cottonseed oil industry
Oilseed crushing industry
Dependence alleviation on exportation of cotton
Exportation dependence
Raw material exportation
Role in balance of trade
Balance of trade
Contribution to GDP
GDP
Contribution to tax income
Tax income revenue
Employment at cotton production
Hired labour
Rural employment
Cotton and economic development
Economic development
- Saved on
- 2020-09-23
- Modifed on
- 2020-09-23
- Administrated by
-
Fok Michel
- Abstract
- In West and Central Africa, the economic and social importance of cotton production used to be claimed, but the indicators put forward were not updated and seldom connected to a governance analysis. This paper compensates for that lack by analysing the governance and the value distribution of the cotton chain in Cameroon in the 2017-18 season. The cotton chain operated under explicit contractual agreements between the cotton company and the cotton producer organizations at village and national level, covering the aspects of the marketing of farmers’ production, the provision of production inputs, the fixing of prices for inputs and outputs, as well as compensation of the producer organization for taking over the tasks traditionally assumed by the cotton company. Overall, in a chain contributing 0.6% to GDP, governance rules were favourable to farmers/villagers in terms of income and task remuneration. However, the mostly small-scale farmers were the only actors bearing the cost of their landlocked situation. Social spill-over resulted from villagers’ initiatives in using their collective income, notably in favour of their children’s education. The case studied highlights the relevance of the concept of relational governance that could involve more than two entities and give rise to social spill-over.
- English abstract
- In West and Central Africa, the economic and social importance of cotton production used to be claimed, but the indicators put forward were not updated and seldom connected to a governance analysis. This paper compensates for that lack by analysing the governance and the value distribution of the cotton chain in Cameroon in the 2017-18 season. The cotton chain operated under explicit contractual agreements between the cotton company and the cotton producer organizations at village and national level, covering the aspects of the marketing of farmers’ production, the provision of production inputs, the fixing of prices for inputs and outputs, as well as compensation of the producer organization for taking over the tasks traditionally assumed by the cotton company. Overall, in a chain contributing 0.6% to GDP, governance rules were favourable to farmers/villagers in terms of income and task remuneration. However, the mostly small-scale farmers were the only actors bearing the cost of their landlocked situation. Social spill-over resulted from villagers’ initiatives in using their collective income, notably in favour of their children’s education. The case studied highlights the relevance of the concept of relational governance that could involve more than two entities and give rise to social spill-over.