

COTTON SECTOR REFORMS IN CHAD: ON MOVE OR STUCKED?

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ABSTRACT

Even though the primary sector in Chad is dominated by the crude oil exploitation (64.6% of the sector added value) agriculture with cotton remains important. In cotton growing areas, 80% of the farmers in Savannah zone grow cotton (338 500 farm holdings out of 423 000). About 2 millions peoples depend on cotton income. For several years, the cotton sector viability is at stake but the liberalization policy, as it is advocated by the World Bank is not yet materializing because of two major facts: Chad is a land-locked country and its cotton company is financially very weak. The modalities of the privatization of the cotton company are not determined: several scenarios are proposed but none is attractive enough to gain consensus. Cotton producers clearly show reluctance to embark into the liberalization process. This is the outcome of a study implemented mainly, but not exclusively, in two villages (Ngoko and Nguétté). The current productivity is restrained by the lack of equipment and use of chemicals. Farmers express the need to be supported to move forward more intensified production, but the required subsidies appear to be little compatible with the liberalization orientation. The technical backstopping to cotton growers, as well as research implementation has somehow vanished but these issues are not really addressed by the proposed policy. So, the outcome of the reform process will be at beat uncertain.

KEYWORDS: Chad, cotton sector, reform, liberalization, privatization

INTRODUCTION

Chad gives the example of the impact of cotton policy on the State and the development of production in a country. In spite of being a land-locked, this country has been the greatest producer of the African Franc Zone till the end of 1970s. Since these years, while other countries succeeded in multiplying the production times five or six over the 20-25 following years, Chad saw its production progress in a very chaotic manner. Chad, today, is at the bottom of the class in relation to cotton production. Its' cotton company is at the final stage of its death throes. In this article, we defend the idea that the present situation of the Chadian cotton is a result of an implementation problem of the cotton policy. This policy which

corresponds to a deep reform of the cotton sector has been decided almost ten years ago and has not yet been able to be put into practice. According to us, such difficulty indicates an internal resistance, notably the public actor, strongly linked to a long history of administrating an economically important sector. At the same, this resistance expresses also a protest, well-founded, against policy judged unsuitable. This impasse situation proceeds then from a policy which cannot be criticized and none is explicitly attempting to question other than a passive resistance. The opposition to a policy, judged inadequate because for many it is imposed from without, is not in fact relayed by an ability to change the orientations in a pragmatic manner.


This paper is articulated as follow: the second part gives indications of cotton production in Chad, the third part gives back factors and process of the cotton sector reform, and the fourth analyses reasons of the impasse in which there is implementation of the agreed-upon cotton policy, while distinguishing the conception short-comings of the policy as well as the resistance behavior of the cotton sector's actors.

COTTON PRODUCTION IN CHAD REPUBLIC

Cotton zone and cotton's relative predominance

With 1,284,000 Km², Chad is a vast country stretching from the Sahara down to the sported Savannah of the central Africa. Until the end of the year 2003 (the starting update of oil exploitation in October 2003), the Chadian economy depended essentially on the rural sectors that contributed up to 80% of the exportations from four products : first the cotton, then the livestock, the leather, the arabic gum. Since the oil exploitation, the oil contributes up to 64.6% to the national added value, followed then by breeding with 17%, Agriculture (with cotton notably) up to 15.3%, and fishing (3.7%). The regression in rank of cotton, within the farming sector in a general sense, is thus perceptible, independently from the oil exploitation effects in the economic structure change in Chad. The being country characterized by natural resources, farming activities and specific population densities. With at least 200 mm of rain per year, the Saharan area is desert, and represents the half of the land. The Sahel area (between 200 mm to the North and 800 mm per year to the South) is steppic, with trees and it concentrates an agro-shepherd population, semi-nomadic to sedentary. The Savannah area that covers 127,000km², be it nearly 10% of the national territory, is the most watered (from 800mm to the South). A characterization of the zone led to its subdivision into nine agro-ecological areas (fig.1). The essential agricultural production comes from the farm area, notable the cotton, with a strong population density. This area is commonly called "cotton zone" because of its predominant place.

Figure-1: Research sites and agro ecological subdivisions into cotton zone in Chad




Before 1998, the National Rural Development Office (NRDO) thought that cotton is grown in 338,500 farm exploitations out of 423,000 in the Savannah area of Chad, be it 80% (Ondr, 1998). Nuttens (2000) precise that cotton is grown in 350,000 farm exploitations out of 490,000, be it 71%. In fact, the income of about two millions people depend on it, be it 1/3 of the resident population in the cotton zone. The predominance of cotton is in all relative in the considered area for the farm activity is characterized by the duality cotton growing and food crops. The cotton represents only 20% of the average area yearly farmed lands that is to be compared to the 30.40% met in other countries producers of cotton in the franc zone in Africa.

The cotton constitutes the third of the agricultural/farm production of the area, the 2/3 provided by food crops, mainly the sorghum, millet the groundnut, the maize and the rice. The farm production system is yet extensive though one observes a certain level of equipment, accordingly the implantation of the cotton growing. It has been considered in 1998 (Ondr, 1998) that a third of exploitations was equipped with plows, the rate was 26% in 2003, in the same order of the one registered in 2000 (24%): On the other hand, only an exploitation out of fifteen had at its disposal a cart for the transportation. Globally, the equipment level is quite inferior as compared to Burkina Faso and Mali.

A CHAOTIC PRODUCTION

If the support for the cotton production, in the favorable climatic area to this crop, is enough similar to what is observed in other countries of the franc zone in Africa, this crop growing development in Chad is very particular. As one can see it, the Chadian cotton development has been very chaotic for four decades (fig.2). In the first place, it is advisable to notice that there is no good correlation between the purchase price paid to producers and the development of the production in the country, especially since the second half of the 1990s. If the price is a factor of the farmer's decision to produce cotton, it is not a sufficient factor. The Chadian production of cotton had already begun to decline at the end of 1970s when Chad was overtaken by other countries, leaving the first place firstly to La Côte d'Ivoire, then Mali and most recently to Burkina Faso, Chad has well registered an increase of production in the 1980s, but in a fluctuating manner and at a degree lower than as it is in other franc zone of Africa. More remarkable is the fleeting character of the production's increase after the devaluation of the CFA franc that brought about an important increase of the purchase price to producers (at the same time still great increase of the purchase price of the chemicals). In Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin, the increase of the production that allowed to exceed 500-600,000 tones of cotton-grain resulted from a sustained support from farmers, essentially through the extension of the area of cotton, over 7-8 years. In Chad, the process has only lasted for two years.

Figure 2: The development of the cotton production and of its cost price.



Globally, the development of the cotton production in Chad is lesser, regular than it is in other countries of the franc zone in Africa. This development is a bit correlated with the purchase price increase of cotton-grain to producers, indicating that this factor is not the only cause to be questioned. Thus, it means that any policy that would only count on this factor alone could not produce the expected effects of the production increase. Many other factors, among which some are specific to Chad, are questioned but not really taken into consideration in the reform of the cotton policy that will be decided according to a generic analysis of cotton sectors in Africa.

REFORMS OF THE COTTON SECTOR

A reform driven by the denunciation of the state's holdover

Let us underline with Chaboussou and Reullo (2006) that the Africa public policies have known since the dark of independence till this day changes of major orientations. They evolved from that the State was in total control of the economy in the post colonial decade to the present liberalization area, passing through two decades of liquidations of companies and/or state offices judged non profitable. The liquidation of Sategui Deressia Highlighting Office (SDHO), created for rice production in Chad in 1974 but liquidated in 1991 (Djondang, 2002) is an example of such a case. In fact, on the morrow of the African nations' independence the interventionist farm policies, of Keynesian or socialist inspiration, were based on the perception of the decisive agricultural functions. It was expected that this would feed a population which is almost entirely rural and that it would generate the tropical farm products to be exported, such as cocoa, coffee as far as coastal countries are concerned, or cotton, groundnuts for the Sahelian countries. The intervention devices were strongly focused on crops for exportation, supposed to "draw " other productions. But implicitly, the objective was also to take out surpluses to finance a state newly born apparatus (Azoulay and Dillon, 1993; Dufunier, 1996).

The adopted strategy has given birth, in certain countries, to development devices under the gigantesque form projects qualified as the "white elephants" that did not bring about the expected effects of

development. Many management problems have contributed to the formulation of criticism by the neoliberal economists towards the African political powers. This marks the end of illusions of the neo-Marxist trend of thought during the 1960s and 1970s and the powerful rising of criticisms against the African States unable to elaborate a coherent strategy for development. Even though many countries had no privilege to buy big barren projects, the criticism of the Interventionist State generalized itself in all the African countries. It is true that at the beginning of 1980s, the cash boxes of most African state were empty. The aids to development granted to independent countries said to be "developing countries", have not allowed improving the agricultural productivity. The food insecurity persists for instance in the Sahel, it becomes more glaring during some grave drought and tends to become structural. In Chad, as in all the Sub-Saharan African countries, the structural crisis of the economy with its high ratty of debt has favored the setting in place of structural adjustment policy (SAP) [Ministère de l'agriculture, 2002]. This program has served to the "liquidation" of post colonial public policies (Azoulay and Dillon, 1990), in particular through the reform of the State companies. The State companies involved in the cotton production escaped the general criticism until the emergence of crises on the world market. The first crisis arose in 1985, consecutive to an important Chinese production, but it did not bring about the questioning of the organizational mode of the cotton sector. The financial survival of the African cotton sectors was not shaken but really endangered. A second crisis of the world market, at the beginning of 1990s, had international agencies of aid to development, namely the Breton Woods Institutions, to question the organizational mode of the cotton sector, taking note that the well-being of more than twenty million people in the Sub-Saharan Africa depend on cotton (Thewis, 2006).

A long process to stopping a liberalization policy

In Chad the liberalization policy has been ratified after a particularly long process. It has taken seven years for the Chadian Government to clearly opt for a liberalization policy after having decided to withdraw itself from the economy through

Para-State companies. By the order n°17 in 1992, the State of Chad has committed itself to withdraw from Para-public and public companies. The withdrawal process was carried out throughout the development of the law n°4 and its adoption in 1996. About the cotton sector, it has taken up to 1997 to see the creation of a unit of technical support called "cotton observatory", committee of reflection and follow up of the cotton's stream. In 1999, this committee was replaced by another one called "Technical committee in charge of the cotton reform (TCCR)", which is operational till this day.

At creation, this new committee had for mandate to: a) lead reflection in the cotton's stream in order to suggest a strategy of reform in a short and middle course; b) follow the execution of reform once it is approved of by the government in order to give account to the cell in charge of the State's disengagement. The technical committee in charge of the cotton reforms was at the origin of the strategic document of the State's disengagement from the cotton sector. The document was examined and amended several times by the inter-ministerial high committee during the year 1999. It is only at the end of 1999 that it was adopted by the decree n°541 December 19th, 1999. Since then, this document is the one that seals the new cotton policy till today, policy still partially at work, with very disappointing results.

The Tripod of the last reform in force

Like all the South Sahara countries, under the aegis of Breton Woods's institutions, the eradication of poverty has become the leitmotiv of the political discourse. It is proclaimed with great impact in the national strategy of poverty reduction (NSPR) document that all the countries were to establish in order to continue benefiting from the loans from the above mentioned institutions. The reform of the cotton sector in which the government of Chad committed itself in the general policy defined in NSPR document. In a concrete way, this reform's aim is to fight against poverty in the zones of cotton productions, through the increase of cotton producer's incomes. The reform of the cotton sector turns around two axes which are: the disengagement of the state from the capital and from the administration of the cotton company (COTONTCHAD), and

liberalization of the cotton's stream. The implementation of accompaniment measures to benefit cotton producers, in order to play an increasing role in the functioning of the cotton's field of and that they increase in technical performance, along with them the whole Chadian agriculture.

In practice, the strategy of the reform of the cotton sector declines in three points: the privatization of the cotton company (COTONTCHAD) the liberalization of the cotton's stream and the reinforcement of the capacities of the producers' organization. In the NSPR document, it is shown the intention to create committees for local coordination (CLC) essentially centered on the cotton's field of study right there is the farmer's movement in Savannah zone (FMSZ). It is worthy of notice that the movement has been created in 1992 to serve as interface in the negotiation with private operators involved in the cotton's stream (transporters in particular), the cotton company and the government. The putting in place of CLC has been effective from April to May, 2000 (CTRC, 2001). This did not take place without obstacles. However, the TCCR has made known that many of the former FMSZ members are part of the CLC staff. It can be noticed that the producers have attempted to resist the implementation of the reform program by evoking the role of the FMSZ has played in the organization of producers, as noticed for Mali in 2001. With regard to this, one might ask if the producers were going to really play the role that is theirs in the reform program.

Some say that the associative process behind the FMSZ is negatively judged at the government level; it is thought to be too much trade union inclined, its vigilance on the sharing of profits generated at the exportation of cotton is not easily accepted. Without doubt that even its denomination "movement" made it less acceptable; and to bring it down it was easy to blame its lack of democratic working. Thus at the level of declared objectives, the preoccupation of the farmers' interests is high. One could not say that it was so in practice.

An execution of the reform filled with hesitation about the clauses

The seizure of the State remains very strong, paradoxically, in a process destined to disengage it from the cotton sector. The government has in fact committed to TCCR, an entity put in place by the government itself, the responsibility of the reform's follow-up in addition to the missions of performer in the areas: a) of immediate measures of recovery of the cotton company; b) of institutional measures at the cotton sector level, and c) of accompaniment measures of the producers.

Regarding the institutional measures, the TCCR has put in place a joint committee comprised of COTONTCHAD, of producers representatives and of the state representative observers. This committee has in particular the responsibility to fix cotton price to the producers and prices of the chemicals. The committee is also in charge of going through invitations to tender for the chemicals' supply and it decides of services to the cotton producer's organization (PO). The determining of the purchase price of cotton to producers takes into account the productions cost of estimation, with an aim to release a benefit to the producers. That is why the report of the joint-committee's meeting of 2006 has assessed the cost of production of a hectare of cotton-grain to 50221 FCFA share between NPKSK (15000 FCFA, a 50 kg bag), Urea (14500 FCFA) a 50kg bag), 1200FCFA for batteries to five treatments and 830 FCFA for the insecticide's dose.

It is in the domain of privatization of the cotton company, COTONTCHAD, those hesitations and uncertainties have been more patent. The government had for a longtime shown a prudence hesitating between two scenarios: a sale by shares (first scenario) or sale by assets in three lots divided into three sub-regions (Angé, 2004 a, Angé, 2004b). All the factories or all the sub-regions, however, do not present the same potential interest in relation to their service through the road infrastructures to evacuate the cotton produced by Douala port. It is an element that contributed to stimulating a choice of a privatization scenario. It was until the operational opening of Moundou-Ngaouderé road, from 2005, almost six years after the launching of the

privatization process, in order to moderate the debate on the differential of profitability of the 3 zones' factories. From now on, the factories are at equidistance, according to the works of the technical team in charge of the implementation of the terms of reference. The road Moundou-Ngaoudéré offers even the possibility of extension of the cotton's growing to other zones. Amazingly, there is a consensus today to privatize factories in a single lot that is the acquirer takes globally the 9 factories that are presently operational in the cotton zone. Only one point constitutes the impasse till this day which is the State's decision to disengage itself from the cotton company through the sale by shares.

A reform marked by the forsaking of support services to agriculture

Traditionally the State technical support to the cotton's stream is done through the national office of rural development (NORD) and the agronomics research. To this end, NORD disposes of about 600 agents in the cotton zone before the measures of structural adjustment program (SAP). In the researching, according to our investigations in the technical services, the Chadian State would invest, up to the 1990s, almost 76 millions of franc CFA (about €116 000) for the research in the Savannah area, of which more than the half dedicated to the improvement of the varieties of cotton. About 90 millions of franc CFA (a little bit more than €137 204) were devoted to extension, still in the same area. These numbers may appear insignificant for many countries, but for a country like Chadian Republic whose budget of investment in the development largely depends on external aid, these numbers are indicative of consented efforts for the cotton production. Since the implementation of SAP, the support services in matters of research and supervision of producers have known a drastic drop of the number of their personnel's.

At the NORD level, the size of the supervisory staff has dropped to 122 agents during the time of this study, in 2007, be it only 20% of the former size, without the emerging of other entities to ensure the technical supervision of the producers, except for the small project led by NGOs. The implementation of the down

sizing was really easy because the half of the supervisory personnel was composed of contractual agents whose contracts were not renewed in 1996. The remaining agents were grouped with those of the Breeding Ministry and particularly those of the pastoral organization cell (POC) to ensure the farm popularization during the implementation of the project of pastoral and farm services (PFS), from 1996, financed by the World Bank. At the end of the project in 2000, the uniting institution of the supervisory staff lost all means allowing functioning.

Consequently the farmers were only supervised by NGOs, through projects of development that they led and which do not necessary include cotton in their support program's to development when they do not seek intentionally to turn away farmers from the production of cotton. Concerning research the financing of the Chadian Institute of Agronomics Research for Development (CIARD) has for a long time been omitted after the implementation of the SAP. This institute has only begun to benefit of substantial subsidies since 2005. In other words, the supervision is the only benefit the farm sector gets since 2000. This is the direct and wanted consequence of the application of the structural adjustment program that commanded the reduction of activities of the national office of rural development (NORD) and of the CIARD. Only recently the Chadian government has decided to rehabilitate the role of supervision and research. It has been planned that, right from 2008-2009 campaign, the popularization and supervision services of the cotton producers, as well as the support to the collection and organization of the cotton-grain commercialization be again committed to the national office of rural development (NORD). For CIARD, more means will be at its disposal to improve its capacities of services in the field of research.

THE REASONS FOR THE IMPASSE SITUATION IN THE COTTON POLICY

Disappointing results

Presently, the indicators of performance show that the Chadian cotton stream occupies the bottom among the cotton streams of the African Sub-Saharan. Out of the seven countries (Benin, Burkina, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Mali, Chad, and Togo),

Chad is pushed to the last row, sometimes with a great gap regarding the return, the production and the price to the producers. In fact, the average yield over 9 years (1995-2004) of 1039 kg/ha is observed throughout the zone, while the average return in Chad is 658kg /ha with local variations. Over the same period, Chad has produced 180,000 tons of cotton grain in average with a maximum of 285,000 ton during the 1996/1997 campaign, against an average of 285,000 tons throughout the seven countries. In addition to the weak yield of cotton in Chad, the average price to producers remain also very low (160 FCFA) against the average of 185 FCFA /kg throughout the above seven countries.

Most certainly, the difference of prices to the producer may be explained by the fact that Chad is land-locked and that roads are defective in relation to the other countries, but anyway the reasons for the weak return per hectare are different. The drop of production is particularly strong during the last years and fills financially the cotton company especially when the drop goes beyond the anticipation. For the 2006/2007 campaign, the production has been 98,000 tons of cotton-grain against an initial prevision of 183,000 tons then revised to 152,000 tons. Such a drop of the production has led to accumulated deficit of 62.5 billions FCFA and to heavy debts toward the suppliers. To remedy the crisis that undermines its good functioning, COTONTCHAD has announced economical measures in order to face the accumulated debts. It is about: a) reducing the exploitation costs, b) forecasting moratorium in the payment of debts, respectively about the five years and the two years toward the State and the suppliers, and c) down sizing of the company's personnel in touch with the farm producers. One must not wonder that these last years, the relationships between the cotton company and its partners are not that good. They are not better with the farmers. This degradation of relationships strongly influences the state of depression of the cotton production today.

Producers penalized in spite of contrary declaims

In spite of the contrary declaims and affirmations of the national strategy of poverty reduction (NSPR) document, the cotton producers see the very least of their interests taken into consideration in the

reform process of the cotton stream. The interests of farmers are touched in the fixation of the purchase price, pointed toward the fall in order to wipe off a debt of 11.2 billions of the cotton company in 2000. The producers would have endured the drop of price to 150FCFA (for an estimate of 200,000 tons) against 194 FCFA the precedent year, contributing thus up to 3 billions. The cotton company was moreover to negotiate with the transporters for a reduction of the transport cost (60FCFA/ ton/km instead of 64 FCFA), and to do the same with other service providers. The State was to put 2,5billion into the national budget's account (Ctrc, 2000a). Thus, the farmers have effectively been may be the only ones to do it because it is not known if COTONTCHAD has effectively been able to reduce the costs, nor if it has succeeded in negotiating the drops with the transporters and other service providers. The interests of the producers are also touched in their associative movement, through the implementation of a radical change. In executing the NSPR document, the TCCR has created committees of local coordination (CLC) in replacement of the Farmers Movement in Savannah area (FMSZ). In fact, the CLCs are created ignoring the joining principle. The process did not preserve the prior consent of villagers associations for the creation of CLCs; it is rather a capturing of the FMSZ' mandate. Today, there are 10 CLCs and a national union of cotton producers of Chad (NUCP) put in place in April, 2007 to partake in the privatization of the cotton company.

The persistence of the temptation to intervene

It is necessary to say that many constraints prevent the application of the public policies of development in Chad, notably through the NSPR. In the farm sector, an insufficiency of application of the economic liberalization policy, the State's commitment to the transportation of the commercial and productive functions to the private sector is put at unease by the implementation of the subsidy on the farm material and farm chemicals, without doubt because there is a fear that the privates that would assume the supplying of products would sell at the equipment and the farm chemicals (Table-1). Thus, contrary to what was heard, the NORD did

not relinquish activities of the supply of farm material nor of the micro-finance come under this report. This situation may also justify an apposed increase by saying that it is the pursuit of the role of the NORD that discourages farmers, in factors of production.

Table-1: Cost of cotton chemicals

Type of chemicals	At cost price (100% approach cost)	Effective transfer cost 2006/2007 (approach cost)	Subsidy (%)
NPKSB (FCFA/sack de 50 Kg)	17 023	14 999	11,9
Urée (FCFA/sack de 50 Kg)	16 256	14 469	11
Insecticidal (FCFA dose)	855	831	2,8
Battery (FCFA unité)	135	121	10,4
Treatment apparatus	23 541	23503	0,2

At the level of the cotton-grain's purchase price fixation to the producers, the government has made use of the changeable price to incite to production in disconnection with the reality of the world market. Thus, having observed the drop of the cotton in 2003, the government has announced the re-launching of the stream promising the rise of prices to producers from 160 to 170FCFA. The increase of price produced the expected effect of the increase of the lands and of the cotton production in 2004. Since Chad Rep has not been able to sustain the support policy of the purchase price, the production dropped again, even greater than ever. The 2006/2007 campaign has been more difficult. The forecasting's estimate a production of about 280.000 tons, while it has not been but 120.000 tons.

Problem of maladjustment of the accepted cotton policy: A history and a local context ill-apprehended in the formulation of the policy

The development of the cotton production in Chad is marked by many phenomena, with wide scope, and which are not under the control of the cotton sector or of the cotton company. The very chaotic development of the production is not uniquely to be read like an expression of the performance of the organizing mode of the cotton sector. In other words, it is not sufficient to modify this organizing mode for the production to become better. Worse, in touching an organizing mode

which is not necessarily inappropriate as such, one risks to arrive at results yet more disappointing. Alas, this is seen today. In 1971, the colonial cotton company "COTONFRANC" has been nationalized and renamed "COTONTCHAD". Due to the importance of cotton in the development, the president Tombalbaye lunched a wide operation called "Operation 750.000 tons of cotton" in 1975, obliging all the socio-professional strata to work in the cotton fields. He had envisioned a State production in addition to the farmers' production. The operation was spreading right from the capital city Ndjamenà to the cotton zone in the south of the country. This performance stopped in 1980, in the beginning of wars that shook the economy of the country. As an indication, Chad is one of the rare countries that had to face social revolts shortly after the independence. The first broke out as early as 1963 at Mangalmé in the Guéra, it led to civil wars with a first armed conflict that lasted from February 19th 1979 to June 7th 1982, and that is still on today.

Insufficient and incompatible structures with the expected effects of liberalization

Suddenly, Chad as well as the other countries producers of cotton in the sub-region is confronted with the liberalization problem of the cotton stream. In fact, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund advocate the liberalization of the cotton stream in Francophone Africa. They considered that by breaking the monopole of the national companies the farmers will be better paid, for they will be able to sell their products to companies that, under competition between themselves, will propose better prices to farmers. The benefits of liberalization depend very much on the easiness of products' circulation. There is no question in the developed countries but it is crucial in the countries that suffer from the lack of transportation infrastructures. This is the general case in the Sub-Saharan countries, and it is the case of Chad in particular. The cotton producers in Chad, as well as those in other Land-locked countries of Africa, are penalized by the cost of transportation both for the chemicals' cost price and for the purchase price of the cotton-grain as well. If the prices are applied according to the real cost of transportation, only the closest producers to the Cameroonian

border would be favored. It is to be noted moreover that the Savannah zone of Chad spreads according to the rate of meteorological variation in relation to distance in the west (Léré) -East (Kiabé). The blind application of the liberalization policy would be synonym of resorption the cotton production to a restricted zone. One may then understand the farmers' distrust facing such a policy when they find themselves, and they are many, far away from the Cameroonian border. The case of the commercialization of the food products attests of the harmful effects of absence of coordination. The markets of food products remain less structured of all time and none ignores, starting from the farmers, that the prices, subject to the only market laws, are influenced by the transportation costs which are generally high, the weak capacities of storage and the climatic variations. It proceeds from it that producers touch low prices that do not incite them to invest in order to produce more.

The economical performances of the cotton production are appreciated in relation to meteorological variation in the West-East. In fact, the factory zones in the West appears to be more dynamic from the stand of farmers raising funds to take over factories and of the preparation to becoming shareholder in the announced privatization of the cotton company. However, in the Eastern region, the awareness in relation to the stake was late and affected the level of the (fund raising) collection.

The difference seen in the production makes manifest the problem of the liberalization option of the cotton sector. A strictly economical reasoning would reduce the cotton production in the Western zone (Hauswirth and Reoungal, 2007) but it is not certain that the short term economic effects be positive if the economic and social upheavals in the Eastern zone are taken into account. The option consisting of not erasing the cotton production in the Eastern zone has been presented by some as a more social option of the policy, by taking into consideration, the economic situation is already very difficult in the considered zone. It may also be said that it is a question of an economic vision more responsible, with a temporal perspective longer than the one considered by the experts of the Breton Woods Institutions.

A stubbornness problem in a maladjusted policy

The option of reinforcing the power of farmers in a cotton sector proceeds from an ambitious approach. In the context of the stream's reform, the State has in place a networking of the OP of cotton farmers promoted by NORD through the FMSZ that has done, taken back by TCCR to create the CLC. The FMSZ is made up of the whole regrouping (consolidation) of villagers Associations of the Savannah zone. Nevertheless, the CLC is the regrouping of the villagers associations at a canton level. It is from April, 2007 that the cotton area counts ten CCLs and a top structure, namely the national union of cotton producers in Chad (NUCPT) [COTONTCHAD, 2007]. But the study done by the Canadian research department reveals that the present statute of CLC and starting from the NUCPT does not allow the producers to hold shares through their organization during effective privatization of the cotton company. They must be transformed into Cooperative and that is not yet done. The recent character of the POs in Chad, the upheaval of their functioning over the last years, the low level of the competences and their means of action make appear the ambitious side, even realistic, of the targeted objective. It is to fear that the ideological attachment to the farmers "empowerment", most certainly to be praised, has made to totally lose ground with the reality; such an analysis is strengthened by results of a recent research.

Upon an international call for tender, the Canadian research center and of international cooperation (CRCIC) has been recruited to realize an organizational and institutional analysis of CCLs (COTONTCHAD, 2007). The object of the work was to assess the institutional and functional performances of each CLC (presently there exist 10 CLC: 2 for Moundou factories' zone and 1 for each of the 8 other factory zones). This assessment was to allow the cotton PO network in Chad to position itself in the stream by holding shares during the effective privatization and liberalization of the stream. The study has been done in two sets; i-the organizational analysis of the CLCs; then, ii- the restitution of the results of the analysis and elaboration of the planning.

About the positioning of producers as economic actors in the process of privatization and liberalization of the cotton stream, it appears that there must be restructuring of the PO as a whole by integrating it in a vertical way to the stream by the take-over of new functions with an economic trait. With regards to the functional aspect, the PO network must have at its disposal a legal statute with the governing mechanisms clearly stated. Concerning the operational aspect, the functioning of the PO networking must be guided by internal regulations, with a well structured system of compatibility and an effective physical existence.

There is then much to do at the level of the present PO networking, the desired developments of this networking are not automatic, they are conditioned by several factors: i) the CLC leaders' ability to convince their peer cotton producers to adhere to this planning; ii) the maintenance of the political willpower to support the reinforcement of the cotton POs; iii) the support granted by the CTRC to technically and financially give and support the first steps in the planning, until the technicians are able to be employed by the networking to take over the CTRC; iv) the ability of the producers, with the support of partners, to mobilize necessary funds to execute the planning.

It is to mention to this end that it is estimated that budget of about \$4 millions (US dollars) is necessary to implement the planning; v) the availability of an experienced competent technical assistance in the domain of organizational reinforcement and of the cotton stream; vi) the ability to gather in cooperative enterprises and to be functional before the privatization of the COTONTCHAD. There must be much optimism or saintliness to believe that all this requirements may be met, in a satisfactory manner and at a same time.

CONCLUSION

Chad offers a sad example of cotton policy from a very insufficient taking into account of the context and of the local history. It is a case of exaggeration of a generic analysis (on the State enterprises' lack of performance) of a country by omitting the specificity of the context and of the country's history.

Since 1999, Chad, in part due to its defendant part, might have adopted a policy based on the all-upside down, strongly marketed by the tendency to replace what works, even if it is largely perfectible, by a new device more piloted by the ideology. It is firstly the ideology of liberalization that occults that the requirements are not met for it to express the potential positive effects. Ideology is also the farmers' "empowerment" setting a very ambitious objectives and too unrealistic in relation to the level and the functioning state of the POs.

Seeing the state of the cotton sector, Chad pays a heavy tribute to the adoption of an erroneous cotton policy. For all that, it remains vital to preserve the cotton production, not only for the product which is in question but also for all the favorable indirect effects to other important ends. It is recognizing that cotton plays a predominant role in the production systems of the farmers in the Savannah zone in Chad. Cotton has made the growing of corn to emerge these last years by the use of the fertilizers. Such impact is not no importance at a time of hunger riot's explosion almost every where in Africa.

The objective of this article is not to provide solutions to re-launch the cotton production, but firstly to settle and to share an analysis. The observed tendency is to advocate a come back, by giving back to the NORD for the supervision and to the CIARD the place which was theirs in the research. The impact of such an approach will depend on the means that are really deployed, without thinking that there must without doubt be more persuasion and patience to incite farmers to again produce with eagerness after several years of disappointment and even of trauma.

Regarding the means, certain optimism is allowed by reason of the proposition of help since the time that the African countries have invested the OMC's arena to protest against the cotton subsidies of the wealthy regions or countries. The fundamental question is to know what the duration is given to deploy a cotton policy even more adapted. It would be an illusion to believe a possibility of a rapid recovery. If it is easy rapid, and disturbing to destroy an organizational mode of the cotton

sector, it is long and ungrateful to rebuild on the ruins. The first element to be integrated in a more efficient cotton policy is then firstly the claim for duration.

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